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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) network of connected
devices currently contains more than 11 billion devices and
is estimated to double in size within the next four years.
The prevalence of these devices makes them an ideal target
for attackers. To reduce the risk of attacks vendors routinely
deliver security updates (patches) for their devices. The de-
livery of security updates becomes challenging due to the
issue of scalability as the number of devices may grow much
quicker than vendors’ distribution systems. Previous studies
have suggested a permissionless and decentralized blockchain-
based network in which nodes can host and deliver security
updates, thus the addition of new nodes scales out the network.
However, these studies do not provide an incentive for nodes
to join the network, making it unlikely for nodes to freely
contribute their hosting space, bandwidth, and computation
resources.
In this paper, we propose a novel decentralized IoT soft-
ware update delivery network in which participating nodes
(referred to as distributors) are compensated by vendors with
digital currency for delivering updates to devices. Upon the
release of a new security update, a vendor will make a
commitment to provide digital currency to distributors that
deliver the update; the commitment will be made with the
use of smart contracts, and hence will be public, binding,
and irreversible. The smart contract promises compensation
to any distributor that provides proof-of-distribution, which
is unforgeable proof that a single update was delivered to a
single device. A distributor acquires the proof-of-distribution
by exchanging a security update for a device signature using
the Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment (ZKCP) trustless
data exchange protocol. Eliminating the need for trust between
the security update distributor and the security consumer
(IoT device) by providing fair compensation, can significantly
increase the number of distributors, thus facilitating rapid scale
out.
1. Introduction
The number of IoT devices is continuously increasing.
According to Gartner Inc.1 11 billion connected ”things”
1. https://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3598917
will be in use in 2018, and this figure will reach up to
20 billion by the end of 2020. The massive growth in the
number of connected IoT devices, and particularly their es-
sential need for security software and/or firmware upgrading
(patching), has resulted in the search for reliable and trusted
solutions for distributing software updates on a large scale.
Traditional software update services mainly rely on
a client-server architecture, where bandwidth consumption
and maintenance issues impose high costs and put security
and availability at risk. IoT vendors that wish to provide
software update services for their products are required
to maintain large-scale data centers to support software
distribution to millions of devices2. The wide range of IoT
devices (and firmware) also poses a challenge to the soft-
ware update services commonly used for managing updates
within organizations. Consequently, vendors delegate the
task of updating software to the end users who are not
always aware of the security issues and the importance of
keeping the devices updated.
For these reasons many IoT devices are not consistently
being updated and remain vulnerable to known threats [1],
[2], [3]. Previous works have targeted the availability and
scalability challenges by using a permissionless blockchain-
based decentralized network instead of a private centralized
vendor network [4], [5]. However, these solutions provide no
incentive for non-vendor nodes to host and deliver security
updates, and may face limitations similar to those faced by
centralized vendor networks.
In this paper we propose a novel decentralized and
incentivized IoT update delivery network based on trust-
less proof-of-distribution. The proposed framework utilizes
blockchain, smart contracts, zero-knowledge contingent pay-
ment (ZKCP), and a decentralized storage network. Within
this framework participating nodes (i.e., distributors) are
compensated for delivering software updates to IoT devices.
More specifically, when a new security update is released,
a vendor will agree to compensate (with digital currency)
distributors who deliver the update. The agreement is bound
by a smart contract, making it public and irreversible, which
guarantees compensation to any distributor that provides
2. http://www.channelpartnersonline.com/2017/12/05/
aws-dell-emc-among-vendors-in-rapidly-growing-iot-services-market/
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proof-of-distribution, i.e., unforgeable proof that a single
update has been delivered to a single IoT device. A dis-
tributor acquires the proof-of-distribution by exchanging a
security update for a device signature. To ensure trustless
data exchange we use the Zero-Knowledge Contingent Pay-
ment protocol. Eliminating the need for trust between the
software update distributor and the consumer (IoT device)
by providing fair compensation, can encourage competition,
significantly increase the number of distributors and overall
efficiency, thus allowing rapid scale out.
The main contributions of the proposed framework are:
Availability. The proposed framework ensures high network
availability compared to the current client-server architec-
ture.
Programmable incentivization. The framework makes it
straightforward to support different prioritizations through
minor adjustments to the smart contract. Vendors can decide
to push forward specific critical security updates, prioritize
specific IoT clients, or other relevant settings.
Auditability. The proposed framework allows vendors to
monitor and track the software download of its devices.
Integrity. The proposed framework provides high integrity
of the software.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides a brief introduction to the building blocks of our
proposed ecosystem: blockchain, smart contract, and zero-
knowledge proofs. Section 3 summarizes previous works in
this domain, highlighting the manner in which the proposed
ecosystem addresses the limitations of prior work. The
proposed ecosystem is described in Section 4. In Section
5 we briefly discuss potential attacks and their handling,
and provide a formal claim and proof of the fair exchange.
In Section 6 we discuss the limitations of the proposed
framework and finally, in Section 7 we conclude with the
paper’s contributions and introduce possible directions for
future work.
2. Background
In this section we introduce the technologies utilized
in the proposed framework, providing the necessary back-
ground to understand the protocol and its analysis.
2.1. Blockchain
Blockchain was introduced alongside Bitcoin in Satoshi
Nakamoto’s white paper [6]. A blockchain is a data structure
that can be regarded as a public ledger where groups of
messages are stacked one on top of the other. These groups
of messages are named ”blocks” and with the use of digital
signatures and a distributed consensus algorithm, users in a
non-synchronous configuration (i.e., do not necessarily agree
on time and order of messages) can irreversibly agree with
high probability on a specific order of blocks.
The agreement on the order of blocks is useful for the
prevention of currency ”double-spending” (where messages
within the blocks correspond to money transactions) as the
latter spending can be mutually eliminated by the users, and
is therefore the foundation for Bitcoin and various other
cryptocurrencies [7], [8], [9].
Concretely, each transaction message within a block
contains the coin transfer value, the redeem terms, an input
transaction and the signature of the transaction’s author for
authenticity. The redeeming terms can be referred to as a
boolean predicate such that only a true evaluation can make
use of the transaction. Because published transactions are
a part of a block, they are irreversible and thus redeeming
terms can serve to vouch for coin in exchange for a truth
assignment, which is the foundation of ”smart contracts”.
2.2. Smart Contracts
A smart contract [10] is a protocol that enforces the
negotiation or performance of an agreement. In the context
of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, it is realized by a
traceable and irreversible transaction that can be redeemed
only if a set of terms are met. At their essence, smart
contracts don’t differ from any other kind of transaction and
are primarily named likewise when used with redeeming
terms that are more complex than verifying the receiver’s
identity. However, the contextual notion of being addressed
to anyone who qualifies to specific terms instead of a specific
address makes smart contracts valuable to nodes who wish
to satisfy these terms and collect the value.
The features of blockchain-based smart contracts
evolved from the Bitcoin scripting language that is a simple,
stack-based, and purposefully non-Turning-complete, to a
new blockchain paradigm initiated with Ethereum [7] which
offers Turing-complete stateful languages for writing smart
contracts. The most widely adopted example of such lan-
guage used for developing smart contracts in Ethereum is
Solidity which is a JavaScript-like language. Rootstock 3 is
another example of a blockchain platform offering equiv-
alent smart contract capabilities. Hereafter, the use of the
term smart contracts in this paper refers to the Ethereum
implementation.
2.3. zk-SNARKs
Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive ARguments
of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs) [11], [12], [13], [14] is an
efficient and secure system for proving and verifying zero-
knowledge proofs. It allows a prover to (efficiently) con-
vince a verifier that she possesses knowledge of a secret
parameter, called a witness, satisfying certain properties,
without revealing anything about the secret to the verifier or
anyone else. For example, a prover can convince a verifier
that it has knowledge of a secret w which is the hash
preimage of some value x , without revealing anything about
w . Because zk-SNARKs are succinct, proofs are very short
and easy to verify. More formally, let L be an NP language
and C be a decision circuit for L. A trusted party conducts
a one-time setup phase that results in two public keys: a
3. http://www.the-blockchain.com/docs/Rootstock-WhitePaper-Overview.
pdf
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proving key pk and a verification key vk . The proving key
pk allows any (untrusted) prover to generate a proof pi
attesting that x ∈ L for an instance x of her choice. The
non-interactive proof pi is both zero-knowledge and proof-
of-knowledge. The proof pi has a constant size and can be
verified in time that is linear in |x |.
A zk-SNARK for circuit satisfiability consists of the
following three polynomial-time algorithms:
• Gen(1λ,C ) → (pk , vk). On security parameter λ and
a decision circuit C , Gen probabilistically samples pk
and vk . Both keys are published as public parameters
and can be used to prove/verify membership in Lc .
• Prove(pk, x ,w) → pi. On input proving key pk , in-
stance x and witness for the NP-statement w , the
prover Prove outputs a non-interactive proof pi for the
statement x ∈ Lc .
• Verify(vk , x ,pi) → {0, 1}. On input verifying key vk ,
an instance x , and a proof pi, the verifier Verify outputs
1 if x ∈ Lc .
2.4. Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payments
(ZKCP)
Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment (ZKCP) [15] is a
two-party protocol allowing the fair exchange of information
for payment (e.g., cryptocurrency coins) in a setting where
the two parties do not trust each other to deliver. Besides
being private and secure in theory, it was practically used
in Bitcoin with the use of zk-SNARKs 4.
3. Related Works
Our work falls within the following domains: IoT de-
vices’ patching and decentralized storage networks (also
known as peer-to-peer file sharing networks).
the two categories.
3.1. General Architectures for IoT Patching
Prior to the Internet of Things (IoT) era, traditional host-
centric IT solutions focused on delivering security updates
(i.e., patches) by self-hosting the binary updates to make
them retrievable and available to clients. The availability
and reliability of such solutions may require a complex
server infrastructure and experienced IT personnel as the
number of clients grow, thus making it very expensive for
software providers. Several works targeted the availability
and reliability challenges, including Liu et al. [16] who
suggested a IaaS solution to outsource infrastructure main-
tenance, and Zhen-hai and Yong-zhi [17] who suggested a
Maven-based solution to increase effectiveness in case of
updates’ independence. These solutions were not designed
towards a large number of deployed devices as in an IoT
network.
4. https://bitcoincore.org/en/2016/02/26/zero-knowledge-contingent-
payments-announcement/
Following the rapid growth of IoT networks, the work of
Yu et al. [18] draws the challenges of securing IoT devices
with traditional security, host-centric IT solutions such as
anti-virus and software patches. Mainly, the diversity, cyber-
physical coupling and scale of IoT devices, forces these
security IT solutions to a paradigm shift. Several works
focused on the diversity by suggesting solutions for spe-
cific scenarios [19], and the updating in a not-trustworthy
setting whereas a device may already be infected [20], [21].
However, the abovementioned works do not address the
scalability challenge.
Lee and Lee [4] proposed a firmware update scheme
in an IoT environment based on custom blockchain with
a single-purpose block structure, combined with a peer-to-
peer file sharing network as BitTorrent for the distribution
of updates, to enhance availability, integrity and versions
traceability of updates. This suggestion was improved by
Boudguiga et al. [5] with the addition of trusted innocuous-
ness checking nodes that are in charge of verifying the patch
before it becomes available to deployed IoT devices.
Notably, both of the latter solutions acknowledged the naive-
ness in uploading an entire file to the blockchain, hence
delegated the distribution effort to off-chain approaches.
Nonetheless, they provide no incentive for non-vendor nodes
to join the network, and may thus struggle with similar
limitations as a centralized vendor network.
Another approach worth mentioning is IOTA [22], a
distributed micro-transactions ledger for IoT devices. IOTA
is designed for the exchange of services among IoT devices
(e.g., electricity for cooling), as opposed to IoT devices
patching. Moreover, IOTA’s incentive mechanism is based
on the need of a device to issue a service request and is
therefore unfit for patch delivery.
In our proposed solution we extend the use of a
blockchain-based network for IoT update delivery, and
specifically address the issue of an incentive for providing
the updates (by non-vendor nodes). In addition, the proposed
solution eliminates the need for trust between the security
update distributor and the consumer (IoT device), thus al-
lowing rapid scale out.
3.2. Decentralized Storage Networks
Peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing is a technology for the
sharing of digital media. Imbalanced use (e.g., peers that
avoid uploading) can dramatically reduce the scale and
availability of the network and therefore, sharing incen-
tivization is necessary. The first examples of P2P file sharing
incentivization mechanisms are the BitTorrent’s choking
algorithm [23] and Gnutella’s free riding prevention [24], in
which the download rate for a user that downloads content
yet avoids uploading content, is penalized. Though these
mechanisms have been proven useful for symmetric users
that wish to both download and upload content [25], they
are not designed for an asymmetric sharing scheme.
The asymmetric file sharing scheme is composed of two
types of end-users: distributors that host files and consumers
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that wish to acquire them. Proper incentivization of dis-
tributors within this scheme can be more challenging than
in the symmetric case. However, with the emergence of
the blockchain technology that allows data and currency
exchange in the absence of trust among its users, new forms
of incentivization are unveiled. The most common incentive
is digital currency compensation for either providing stor-
age or bandwidth, which is the case for blockchain-based
decentralized storage solutions such as Swarm 5, Filecoin 6,
Storj [26], and Siacoin [27].
Regardless of these general incentivization schemes,
software patches distribution is a special setting that remains
unaddressed, in which there should be no more than a single
compensation per patch delivered to a device. This setting,
which is the essence of an IoT software updates distribution
system, is the main novelty of this P2P file sharing system.
4. Proposed Framework
The proposed framework allows vendors (i.e., manu-
facturers of IoT devices) a secure and scalable delivery of
security updates to their deployed IoT devices. It is referred
to as a framework because of its general requirements which
allow a variety of concrete implementations. The framework
is comprised of two networks. The first is a decentralized
storage network (DSN) (see Section 4.1), in which security
updates are transferred between network nodes, and the
second is a blockchain network (see Section 4.2), in which
vendors commit to payment in exchange for delivery in
the form of smart contracts, thus incentivizing delivery
within the DSN. Both of these networks are facilitated by
the three types of nodes participating in the IoT updates
delivery network (see Section 4.3): vendors, IoT devices
and distributors. These nodes participate in both networks
and interact with each other to support the paid-for delivery
of updates.
The delivery process (portrayed in Figure 1) is triggered
when a vendor releases a new security update that should be
delivered to its deployed devices. The vendor delegates the
task of serving security updates to its deployed IoT devices,
by publishing a smart contract in the blockchain network
in which he commits to providing coins in exchange for a
proof-of-distribution, i.e., providing a proof of delivering the
update to a deployed device (see Section 4.4.1). Also, the
vendor hosts the new security update, enabling other nodes
to consume via the DSN, for a limited and short period of
time.
Upon publication of the smart contract, distributors can
engage by downloading the update from the DSN, thus
making it available for the IoT devices.
The IoT devices become aware of an update release with
the publication of the smart contract and can now consume
the update from distributors over the DSN (see Section
4.4.2). The update exchange between a deployed device
and a distributor relies on a trustless swap in which the
5. https://github.com/ethersphere/swarm
6. https://filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf
deployed device is updated and the distributor acquires a
proof-of-distribution (see Section 4.4.3), thus paid by the
smart contract (see Section 4.4.4).
4.1. Decentralized Storage Network (DSN)
The decentralized storage network (DSN) must be ac-
cessible by all nodes (peers) in the network. Accessibility
can be achieved with a trackerless peer discovery scheme,
using a distributed hash table (DHT). This suggested scheme
is similar to that of BitTorrent [23] and IPFS [28].
The connected DSN nodes can both consume and serve
files. The set of DSN nodes is denoted as follows:
S = {s1, ... , snS}
4.2. Blockchain Network
The blockchain network must meet the following prop-
erties:
1) Permissionless - any interested party (e.g., an anony-
mous person, organization, or company) can read and
post messages on the blockchain network.
2) Support an intrinsic digital currency i.e., the
blockchain can be interpreted as a public ledger in
which each party has a currency balance.
3) Support smart contracts (as described in Section 2.2).
At the time of this writing, Ethereum [7] is the most
widely adopted example of such an open permissionless
blockchain which also supports Turing-complete smart con-
tract languages, and thus is a recommended realization of
our framework’s required blockchain network.
The set of blockchain network nodes is denoted as:
B = {b1, ... , bnB}
4.3. IoT Updates Delivery Network
4.3.1. Vendor nodes. Vendor nodes are host machines that
are owned by manufacturers of IoT devices. All vendor
nodes must participate in both the DSN and the blockchain
network. Within the blockchain network, vendor nodes must
be able to function as both a wallet and a network routing
node. The set of vendor nodes is denoted as:
V = {v1, ... , vm}
where
V ⊂ S ∧ V ⊂ B
Every vendor node, vi , must maintain the following:
1) a master secret/public keys pair (skvi , pkvi ).
2) a list of its self-manufactured IoT devices public keys.
Each device must have a unique pair of keys. This can
be realized by having the vendor ”burning” a new secret
key into each new manufactured IoT device and adding
the key to its list.
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Figure 1. The architecture of the proposed framework.
4.3.2. IoT nodes. IoT nodes are machines that require
updates by their manufacturing vendor. All IoT nodes par-
ticipate in both the DSN and the blockchain network. Within
the blockchain network, IoT nodes must be able to function
as a network routing node. For every vendor vi ∈ V , the set
of its IoT nodes is denoted:
Oi = {oi1, ... , oin}
where
∀i ∈ [1,m] : Oi ⊂ B ∧ Oi ⊂ S
Each IoT object, oik ∈ Oi , maintains the following:
1) a secret/public keys pair (skoik , pkoik ).
2) public key of its manufacturing vendor (i.e., pkvi ).
The last prerequisite can also be met by having the
vendor ”burn” its own public key pkvi into the IoT device
(thereby adding to the suggestion made in Section 4.3.1,
we can have the vendor burn the pair (pkvi , skoik ) into the
deployed device).
The requirements of IoT nodes can be realized efficiently in
disk space and memory, especially given that IoT devices
are often limited in these resources.
IoT nodes are not required to store a complete copy of
the blockchain. Instead, they can rely on a trusted available
blockchain node (e.g., a gateway), or reduce the trust needed
by consisting of a light client such as under development in
Ethereum 7. The purpose of the light client protocol is to
allow light nodes to download only block headers as they
7. https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Light-client-protocol
appear, while fetching other parts of the blockchain on-
demand, and be sure that the data is correct, provided that
the majority of miners are following the protocol correctly,
and that at least one honest verifying full node exists and
serves the accurate blockchain state.
An alternative memory efficient design could be supported
by Non-Interactive Proofs of Proof-of-Work [29] which
could require only a soft-fork to existing blockchain proto-
cols, and enable verification of a specific blockchain prop-
erty, requiring only resources logarithmic in the length of
the blockchain.
In addition, having the IoT function as a DSN node also
does not impose significant space constraints. The IoT node
is not required to share files in the network, and in the
cases in which of the distributed hash table is used (e.g.,
the Kademlia DHT [30] used in BitTorrent) as the peer
discovery scheme for DSN, only a small constant amount of
memory is required for maintaining internal routing tables.
4.3.3. Distributor nodes. Distributor nodes are host ma-
chines that participate in an open bid for proofs-of-
distribution. They must participate in both the DSN and the
blockchain-based network. Within the blockchain network,
distributor nodes must be able to function as both a wallet
and a network routing node. Distributor nodes are denoted
as:
D = {d1, ... , dnD}
where
D ⊂ S ∧ D ⊂ B
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4.4. Protocol
In this section, we describe the protocol used for a ven-
dor vi ∈ V to send an update file U destined to a group of
IoT objects manufactured by the vendor, Oi = {oi1, ... , oin}
(see Figure 2 for the protocol sketch).
4.4.1. Contract Publication. Upon releasing a new update
U , vendor vi performs the following phases:
1) Hashes the update file Uid := H(U).
2) Generates the zk-SNARKs public proving/verification
keys: (pkPOD , vkPOD) := Gen(1λ,C ).
Here λ is a security parameter, and C is a decision
circuit.
3) Computes update file wrapping package:
P := (U, pkPOD , vkPOD , signvi{Uid , vkPOD}).
4) Hashes Pid := H(P).
5) Sets ∆REFUND to an acceptable time duration for a
patch to be effective.
6) Posts a transaction to the underlying blockchain
network which deploys a smart contract (in
Algorithm 1 we describe pseudo-code for the
contract suitable for Solidity), with a deposit fvi of
money, the hash of the update file wrapping package
Pid , and a program which essentially says:
For each object oik ∈ Oi :
Transfer (fvi \ n) coins to the first party who
provides proof that oik have committed to receive
the hash preimage of Uid , within time ∆REFUND .
Assigning a time limit ∆REFUND for publishing proofs
is important so that the vendor can collect its refund
if some of the IoT objects were not served after some
set time (e.g., because sufficient time has passed such
that a newer update file must be distributed, or because
some remote objects are no longer active).
Note that addressing the specific IoT devices for any
security update becomes possible as the vendor main-
tains the list of their public keys.
4.4.2. Update File Initial Seeding. Routinely, distributor
nodes (denoted D) and the manufactured IoT objects (de-
noted Oi ) are watching the blockchain for an indication that
a relevant smart contract is deployed by a vendor known
by his public key pkvi . This is achievable, for example, by
having the distributors and IoT objects to watch a single
”factory contract” in which upon receiving a message with
the variable arguments, will create a new instance of the
child contract (described in Algorithm 1) and trigger an
event with the public key of the bidding vendor and the
address of the newly created contract.
Upon receiving this contract, the following process starts:
1) Distributors start to request downloading the update
file wrapper package corresponding to the hash Pid
which was published in the smart contract, using the
underlying DSN.
2) The vendor vi transfers (i.e., seeds) the package P
via the DSN (off the blockchain). The file is then
propagated until it eventually reaches some distributor
d ∈ D that wishes to participate in the open bid for
the proofs-of-distribution.
It should be made clear that this initial seeding by the
vendor is meant to last a limited amount of time until a
sufficient mass of distributors has downloaded the file,
and from that point the distribution is expected to be
performed completely by the competing distributors.
3) After completely downloading the package P , d veri-
fies that:
VerifySig(pkvi , signvi{Uid , vkPOD},Uid ||vkPOD) = 1.
4) d registers itself in the underlying DSN peer discovery
scheme, such as a distributed hash table (DHT), as a
holder of the file U using its file hash Uid .
4.4.3. Update File Exchange for a Proof-of-Distribution.
In this procedure, a distributor and an IoT object are con-
ducting a two-party protocol, in which they perform a fair
exchange of the update file for a proof-of-distribution, a
digital signature given by the IoT object which can reward
the distributor with a payment when sent to the smart-
contract.
The fair exchange is achieved in a trustless manner by
applying a zero-knowledge contingent payment (ZKCP [15])
which makes use of a zero-knowledge proof generated by
the distributor and verified by the IoT object. This part is
done in a protocol which is external to the blockchain and
therefore does not require any specific modifications to the
scripting language of the underlying blockchain nor does it
add any burden to the blockchain nodes (so it does not cost
any digital currency fees or gas in the Ethereum jargon).
In details, this process consists of the following steps:
1) oik ∈ Oi performs a lookup for the file U using the
publicly available file hash hU from the smart contract
deployed by vi , and it reaches the distributor d by
using the underlying DSN peer-discovery scheme (e.g.,
DHT).
It then sends d a request to download the update file
which is the hash preimage of Uid .
2) d sends a challenge c to oik to sign on.
3) oik :
- Computes signoik{c} := Sign(skoik , c).
- Sends the tuple (pkoik , signoik{c}) to d .
4) d :
- Verifies that pkoik ∈ Oi .
- Verifies that VerifySig(pkoik , signoik{c}, c) = 1.
- Computes t := Gen(1λ), where Gen is some secure
random key generator for the security parameter λ.
- Computes r := H(pkd ||t).
- Computes s := H(r).
- Computes Uˆ := Enc(U, r) where Enc is some sym-
metric encryption algorithm (e.g., AES).
- Computes x := (Uˆ, s).
- Computes the zero-knowledge proof:
pi := Prove(pkPOD , x , r)
for the NP statement:
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Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for the Proofs-of-Distribution bid contract
1 contract ProofsOfDistributionBid
2 function ProofsOfDistributionBid(v, e, h, o)
// Constructor
3 owner ← v
4 expiration ← e
5 updateHash ← h
6 iot_objects ← o
7 numOfUpdatedObjects ← 0
8 balance ← value // Initial deposit
9 function publishProof(pk_o, t, s, pk_d, signature, r)
10 if block.timestamp ≥ expiration return;
11 if !iot_objects[pk_o] ∨ iot_objects[pk_o].r 6= null return;
12 if r 6= H(pk_d||t) return;
13 if s 6= H(r) return;
14 if verifySig(pk_o, signature, updateHash||s) return;
15 iot_objects[pk_o].r ← r
16 transfer(balance ÷ (n - numOfUpdatedObjects), pk_d) // Decrease balance
17 numOfUpdatedObjects ← numOfUpdatedObjects + 1
18 emitEvent("KeyRevealed", pk_o, r)
19 function withdrawFunds()
20 if block.timestamp < expiration return;
21 if msg.sender 6= owner return;
22 transfer(balance, owner)
∃r s.t. H(r) = s ∧ H(Dec(Uˆ, r)) = Uid .
- Sends the tuple (x ,pi, vkVOD , signvi{Uid , vkPOD}) to
oik .
5) oik :
- Verifies that:
VerifySig(pkvi , signvi{Uid , vkPOD},Uid ||vkPOD) = 1.
- Verifies that Verify(vkPOD , x ,pi) = 1.
- Sends the tuple (signoik{Uid , s}) to d .
4.4.4. Reward Claim for a Proof-of-Distribution. As a
distributor d acquires the proof-of-distribution, he collects
his reward as follows:
1) d :
- Verifies that VerifySig(pkoik , signoik{Uid , s},Uid ||s) =
1.
- Posts a redeem transaction to the smart contract
containing: (pkoik , t, s, pkd , signoik{Uid , s}, r) which
would release (fvi/n) coins to pk
d in return, ac-
cording to the contract description (see function
publishProof at Algorithm 1).
2) oik :
- Watches the blockchain nodes for a relevant event
which is associated with the device’s public key,
pkoik , with the associated decrypting key r (see event
"KeyRevealed" in Algorithm 1).
- Computes Dec(Uˆ, r) to get U .
5. Security
The proposed framework encourages distributor nodes
to participate in the protocol by delivering security updates
to IoT devices in exchange for payment compensation.
Therefore, a secure implementation of the system would
include the guarantee for a fair exchange; i.e., regardless of
a trust setting, every distributor node that delivers an update
to a device is compensated correctly. This section briefly
discusses potential attacks and their handling (Section 5.1)
and ends with a formal claim and proof of the fair exchange
(Section 5.2), thus guaranteeing that the system is secure.
5.1. Threat Analysis
In this work we consider the Dolev and Yao attacker
model [31]. In this case an attacker can read, send and
drop any transaction sent to the blockchain or any other
network packet. In addition, the attacker can be a passive
party eavesdropping on the network packets, or it can be
active by injecting, replaying, or filtering any message to
anyone of the parties involved. Based on this attack model
we consider the following threats to the system:
Denial-of-service (DoS). An attacker can target a vendor
by preventing legitimate transactions from appearing on
the ledger, thus preventing the vendor from posting a new
software update. That kind of an attack is typically referred
to as a censorship attack. By construction, the attacker will
need to control the majority of the mining power of the
network, which is presumably difficult.
An alternative DoS attack is preventing a vendor from
uploading new software update to the distributors network,
or preventing an IoT device from downloading new soft-
ware from the distributor. These attacks are mitigated using
the multiple independent access points provided by the
decentralized storage network. Using a decentralized peer-
discovery scheme, such as a distributed hash table (DHT) as
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used in BitTorrent [32] and IPFS [28] as examples, further
allows fault tolerance and reduces single points of failure.
Furthermore, an attacker could prevent the connection from
the IoT device to the blockchain network, thus preventing
the device from being notified about new software updates.
However, the various access points given by the blockchain
network assist in mitigating this threat.
Compromising software integrity. An attacker can imper-
sonate a vendor and try to publish a malicious software
update to the IoT devices. The integrity of the firmware
update is ensured by the ability of the IoT device to verify
the received file U by its hash Uid specified in the contract.
The contract was created by the vendor in a transaction
signed by him and verified against his known public key.
Software downgrade attack. An attacker may cause an IoT
device to downgrade its software to an outdated version
(which may include known vulnerabilities). This threat is
mitigated using the consensus regarding the order of the
blockchain’s transactions, which implies ordering of the
updates versions.
5.2. Proof of Fair Exchange
Let Uij be the j th update of the vendor vi .
Claim: Except a negligible probability in the security pa-
rameter λ, a distributer node dq can receive the payment
compensation C (Uij , oik) if and only if:
1) dq delivered the security update Uij to the IoT device
oik , and
2) No other distributor dp (p 6= q) received C (Uij , oik)
Proof: Let SCij be the smart contract published by the
vendor vi towards the delivery and compensation of the
update Uij . The contract SCij contains the set of IoT devices
Oi , with their proofs-of-distribution (if received). By the
contract construction, for every rx , a successful proof-of-
distribution for the update Uij and device oix , the object oix
is assigned with rx only if it was not previously assigned.
For any distributor dp (p 6= q) to receive C (Uij , oik)
prior to dq , a published transaction reporting the proof-of-
distribution dp is required for Uij , oik . If this transaction
is indeed published, Oi already has an r assignment for
oik , thus a distributor node dq cannot receive C (Uij , oik)
as required. We therefore, continue by assuming C (Uij , oik)
was not yet received by any distributor.
Assuming C (Uij , oik) is still available, in order for dq to
receive it – the smart contract SCij must induce verify(·) =
1. Therefore, if dq did not deliver the security update Uij to
the IoT device oik he is required to provide the contract with
a forged published proof and yet suffice verify(·) = 1. Based
on the security parameter of the system λ, a distributor dq
can forge this proof only if:
1) The distributor forges oik digital signature; i.e., dq
forges signoik{Uid , s, pkd}.
2) The distributor forges the entire zk-SNARKs’ proof-of-
knowledge.
3) The distributor uses the proof-of-distribution of another
distributor, dq′ , as his own. i.e., dq manages to find a
hash preimage t ′ s.t H(pkdq ||t ′) = H(pkdq′ ||t) = r .
Based on their definitions and the use of the λ parameter
in the protocol, digital signatures, zk-SNARKs and hash
preimaging are unforgeable except with negligible proba-
bility in λ. Therefore, dq cannot receive C (Uij , oik) without
a proof-of-distribution except with a negligible probability
in λ.
In the other direction, by the completeness of zk-
SNARKs, a distributor dq that delivers Uij to the IoT device
oik will be able to acquire a proof-of-distribution and can
publish it to collect C (Uij , oik), assuming that the IoT object
will not disconnect in the middle of their two-party protocol.
If no other distributor collected C (Uij , oik), based on the ir-
reversibility of the blockchain, the smart contract is binding,
thus dq will be able to receive the C (Uij , oik) payment as
required.
It should be noted that the vendor vi , which has performed
the zk-SNARKs setup to generate the proving and verifica-
tion keys, can theoretically forge proofs to falsely convince
IoT devices that he has delivered them the update file.
However, since this will serve him only in getting his own
vested funds from the smart contract, and beat his own
original purpose to update his manufactured devices, we
argue that this is not a real limitation of the protocol.
6. Discussion
Implementation of the proposed framework is based on
several assumptions.
Amount of data needed to be stored and sent to
the blockchain. Given the need for maximum security from
forging signatures on behalf of IoT objects, we are required
to actually list the entire set of public keys of the destination
IoT objects. In addition, based on the hope that all of the
micropayments offered will be redeemed, a similar number
of transactions, each containing its corresponding proof-of-
distribution along with the public keys of the distributor and
the IoT object, would be sent to the blockchain.
Some optimizations can be made:
1) Using batched transactions for sending multiple redeem
proofs - constructing the contract so multiple redeem
transactions can be aggregated into one. This can be
even more useful when combining with a signature
aggregation scheme (such as Schnorr signatures) within
the smart contract, as is planned to be implemented
with Bitcoin [33]. The latter would help reduce the
number of signatures needed in cases in which a
distributor can serially send aggregated signatures to
multiple IoT objects (the multiple messages still must
be included in the transaction).
2) Sending an index of the public key in the redeem
transaction instead of the whole public key.
At the time of this writing, Ethereum blockchain at its
current capacity is able to process 10-15 transactions per
second with blocks roughly every 15 seconds, where the
median transaction fee is around 25 cents. As the underly-
ing blockchain is currently the bottleneck of the suggested
framework’s scalability, other consensus layer scalability so-
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lutions [34] and platforms can directly benefit our proposed
solution.
Some trust assumptions regarding IoT objects. The
proposed scheme allows the possibility of an IoT object o
to cheat and pretend it is a distributor in order to reduce the
need to upload an entire update file U to the blockchain.
This can be done by posting a transaction to the smart
contract containing the distributor’s signature on some string
r and its corresponding hash s , where r is not an actual
random key that decrypts an encryption version of the
update file U but is rather just some arbitrary data used
to give o the desired micropayment.
Even though this dishonest behavior is possible in cases in
which the IoT object’s client software is hacked or compro-
mised, we argue that the IoT software update micropayment
cost was actually encompassed in the cost of the device
when it was purchased, and we further argue that the act of
updating the software is of greater benefit to the IoT buyer
than settling for the coins instead.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
We have described a decentralized architecture which
utilizes a trustless network to provide software updates to
IoT devices. It is based on an economic model where com-
pensation and cost are aligned with the requested service.
Service providers (the distributors) have the incentive to per-
form honestly and quickly, since they know that they will get
paid if and only if they will be the first to distribute updates
to destination IoT objects, and will earn in proportion to the
number of clients served. The presented system allows high
availability of software updates with fault tolerance, integrity
and the ability for a high quality of service in comparison to
traditional architectures. Also, it is compatible but not lim-
ited to existing blockchain platforms such as Ethereum. For
future work, we are interested in investigating performance
benchmarks and scalability improvements which will enable
the suggested ecosystem to stretch its ability to support the
ever-increasing number of IoT devices.
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Figure 2. IoT software update protocol sketch. Here C is a decision circuit, x is the instance and r is the secret witness, for the NP statement
∃r s.t. H(r) = s ∧ H(Dec(Uˆ, r)) = Uid
